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We study behavior in the race game with the aim of assessing whether teams can cre-
ate synergies. The race game has the advantage that the optimal strategy depends nei-
ther on beliefs about other players nor on distributional or efficiency concerns. Our 
results reveal that teams not only outperform individuals but that they can also beat 
the “truth-wins” benchmark. In particular, varying the length of the race game we 
find that the team advantage increases with the complexity of the game. 
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1 Introduction 
In studies on strategic reasoning, teams have been found to adhere closer to standard game-
theoretic predictions than individual players. In two papers on the guessing game, Kocher and 
Sutter observe decisions by teams to approach the Nash-equilibrium quicker than those by indi-
viduals (Kocher and Sutter, 2005, Sutter, 2005). Also, teams play the Nash-equilibrium strategy 
more often in one-shot normal-form games studied by Sutter et al. (2013) and behave more ra-
tionally in information cascade situations as Fahr and Irlenbusch (2011) observe. Yet, so far the 
nature of these differences in behavior remains unclear. Maybe teams are just as smart as their 
smartest member? Or, do people reasoning together create synergies?   
The idea that teams perform as well as their best member has been discussed in the psychology 
literature since the 1950s. It is known as the “truth-wins” hypothesis which was proposed by 
Lorge and Solomon (1955) and by Marquart (1955). If teams beat this benchmark, we can con-
clude that they are more than the sum of their parts and are able to generate insights none of its 
members would have had alone. Focusing mainly on non-interactive tasks, results from the psy-
chology literature on small groups suggest that teams usually do not reach the truth-wins bench-
mark, let alone beating it, as Kerr and Tindale (2004) summarize.2 The evidence from economics 
is less clear cut.  
On the one hand, findings from experiments run by Charness et al. (2007), Charness et al. (2010) 
and Casari et al. (2011) point into the same direction as the psychology literature. Charness et al. 
(2007) study decisions in an urn experiment with respect to Bayesian updating and (first-order 
stochastic) dominance. They find that error rates drop with the number of decision makers. How-
ever, when comparing two-person and three-person team performance with individual perfor-
mance, most teams apparently do not reach the truth-wins benchmark. Charness et al. (2010) 
study the conjunction fallacy, i.e. the tendency of decision-makers to violate the rule that the 
probability of the intersection of two events cannot exceed the probability that one of the two 
events occurs. In their experiment teams of two and three violate this rule less often than individ-
uals, but also fall short of the truth-wins benchmark. Similar findings are reported by Casari et al. 
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 See also the textbooks by Larson (2010) and Laughlin (2011) for an overview. Teams sometimes reach the bench-
mark in tasks that have a demonstrably correct solution, for example in mathematical problems (Laughlin and Ellis, 
1986) or in the game of Mastermind (Bonner et al. 2002). They beat it on Letters-to-Numbers problems (Laughlin et 
al. 2002). Charness and Sutter (2012) and Kugler et al. (2012) provide overviews on the economics literature. 
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(2011). The authors study bids in a company takeover game and find that teams of three place 
better bids than individuals, i.e. less bids that yield an expected loss or less bids that are dominat-
ed by others. Yet, teams underperform with respect to the truth-wins benchmark. However, simi-
lar to the psychological studies, these three experiments require no, or only little, strategic reason-
ing: In the first two, subjects face a non-interactive decision task; in the third, subjects play 
against a buyer who simply accepts all offers yielding a positive profit.  
Analyzing strategic interaction, Cooper and Kagel (2005), on the other hand, observe that teams 
of two are able to beat the truth-wins norm. They focus on behavior in signaling games with nu-
merous equilibria which are based on the entry limit pricing model by Milgrom and Roberts 
(1982). Cooper and Kagel identify a subset of moves as “strategic” and show that teams behave 
more strategically and thereby beat the truth-wins norm in some variants of the game. Interpret-
ing the individuals’ speed of learning as a measure of difficulty, Cooper and Kagel conjecture 
that the team advantage is positively related to the difficulty of learning to play strategically. In 
light of the experimental evidence Charness et al. (2010) speculate that “the additional layer of 
complexity may lead to a greater degree of synergy” in strategic games (p. 555). Unfortunately, 
in strategic interactions it is often difficult to judge what constitutes “better” performance (and, 
accordingly, a greater degree of synergy) a priori. Does it mean increasing payoffs? Or, adhering 
closer to the predictions derived from game-theoretic models under the assumption of strictly 
selfish preferences and common knowledge of rationality?  
This study provides a clean test of the conjecture made by Charness et al. (2010). To overcome 
the aforementioned interpretation problems, we employ the race game, which has recently come 
into focus of economists (see, e.g., Burks et al., 2009, Dufwenberg et al., 2010, Gneezy et al., 
2010, and Levitt et al., 2011). The race game is a two-player constant-sum game with complete 
and perfect information that has a dominant strategy, which can be found by backward induction. 
Optimal behavior in this game does not depend on beliefs and is the same for all potential prefer-
ences that value one’s own payoff higher than the opponent’s. The only way to increase payoffs 
is to adhere closer to the game-theoretic prediction. Therefore this game allows for a comparison 
of team performance with the truth-wins benchmark and the identification of synergies. Moreo-
ver, by varying the length of the game we can check whether a relationship between the complex-
ity of the strategic interaction and the differences between individual and team performance ex-
ists, as suggested by Charness et al. (2010). To our knowledge this is also the first study that al-
4 
lows comparing the ability to apply the fundamental game-theoretic concept of backward induc-
tion (in isolation) between teams and individuals.  
2  Experimental Design  
In a race game G(m, k), two players alternate in choosing integers between 1 and k. All chosen 
values are summed up and the player who can choose a number that makes the sum equal to m 
wins. The race game is a combinatorial game that can be solved by backward induction. If player 
1 wants to win and reach m on her last move, she needs to secure the winning position m-(k+1) in 
the preceding move. This way, limited to a choice between 1 and k, player 2 will not be able to 
reach m on his turn. In order to secure this winning position, however, player 1 also needs to se-
cure m-2(k+1) on the move before, or, generally, m-n(k+1) on her n-th to last move.3 Applying 
this strategy, the first mover can win all race games except those where m is divisible by (k+1). 
In our experiment we aimed to compare the performance of teams and individuals in race games 
of different lengths. Subjects played twelve race games G(m, k=4) consisting of two identical 
series of games with m taking the values 19, 3, 29, 8, 11 and 21. The games varied from zero to 
five steps of reasoning that are necessary to find the first winning position. In the following we 
refer to the two series as part 1 and part 2. To increase comparability between individuals and 
teams, subjects played against a computer programmed to play the winning strategy outlined 
above – if possible. Subjects moved first in all games and could – theoretically – reach a winning 
position in the first move of all games. If the computer could not reach a winning position, it re-
sorted to random play. Subjects were unaware of the total number of games but knew that the 
computer “tries to win” each game.  
Our implementation of the race game and the experimental procedures were based on the study 
by Brosig-Koch et al. (2012) that considers the relationship between age and the capability to 
backward induct. We used their graphical interface and framed the players’ goal as securing a 
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 As Dufwenberg et al. (2010) and Levitt et al. (2011) point out, this procedure is not backward induction in the strict 
sense as a player does not need to solve for his opponent’s optimal choice. Nevertheless, solving this game might 
still be a challenging computational task for most people. 
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treasure.4 The instructions were read out aloud and were accompanied by a presentation and a 
video. They were followed by five control questions. After the two series of race games the ex-
periment concluded with a short questionnaire. The complete instructions and the control ques-
tions are included in Appendix A. The video is available upon request. 
In the Individuals treatment 21 subjects participated, 12 of them women. Subjects made the deci-
sion individually at a computer and were paid 5 Euros for each game they won. In the Teams 
treatment 24 subjects participated in 12 same-gender teams, half of them female. In this treatment 
both team members also used an individual computer, but each member had two computer 
screens available. One screen showed the game, the other a chat interface that connected both 
team members and allowed them to exchange text messages during the course of the 12 games. 
Only one subject in each team could enter the team’s decisions. The other subject saw a copy of 
the decision-maker’s game screen. Each subject received 5 Euros for each game the team won. 
All subjects were students and 20 years old at the time of the experiment.5 They were recruited 
with ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). Experiments were conducted at the Essen Laboratory for Experi-
mental Economics (elfe) using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). On average subjects earned 30.0 Euro 
and were paid using a double-blind procedure. 
3  Results 
A first view on the results confirms the common finding: Teams adhere closer to standard game-
theoretic predictions and outperform individual players. On average they win almost two more of 
the 12 games. Individuals only win 41.3 percent of the games while teams win 57.6 percent. The 
difference in performance is significant (p = 0.003, exact two-tailed Mann-Whitney-U test) and it 
persists when considering the first and the second part of the experiment separately (p ≤ 0.015, 
exact two-tailed Mann-Whitney-U tests). The number of games teams or individuals win does not 
differ between both parts (p ≥ 0.183, exact two-tailed Wilcoxon tests). Also, comparing the two 
instances of each game individually yields no significant differences (p ≥ 0.250, exact McNemar 
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 Before the first move in each game, the value of m is hidden to the subjects but can be uncovered by costless clicks. 
All teams and 15 of 21 individuals uncovered the treasure before their first move in every game. After the third 
game, all individuals except one uncovered the treasure before the first move.  
5
 All data at the individual level is included in Appendix B. The data from the Individuals treatment is also analyzed 
in Brosig-Koch et al. (2012). 
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tests). That is, we do not observe any learning for teams and individuals. Table 1 displays the 
share of games won in each of the 12 games. 
 
Table 1 – Share of games won (in percent) 
Game 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
m 19 3 29 8 11 21 19 3 29 8 11 21 
Individuals 14.3 100.0 0.0 71.4 47.6 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 81.0 66.7 14.3 
Teams
 
25.0 100.0 8.3 100.0 75.0 16.7 25.0 100.0 16.7 100.0 91.7 33.3 
 
 
 
In the spirit of Cooper and Kagel (2005), we also check whether teams create synergies and are 
able to beat the truth-wins benchmark. For this purpose we compare the performance of our real 
teams to the performance of simulated teams that aggregate individual performance according to 
the truth-wins hypothesis. More precisely, we randomly draw (with replacement) 12 observations 
of women and 12 of men playing alone. We then match them into two-person same-gender teams 
and record the average performance of all 12 simulated teams – assuming that each simulated 
team performs as well as its best member. We repeat this process 100,000 times. Following 
Cooper and Kagel (2005), we consider teams to beat the truth-wins benchmark when they win 
more games than 95 percent of the simulated teams or, in other words, when their average per-
formance lies above the 90-percent confidence interval (CI) of simulated team performance.6 
Over all games, the simulated teams win 47.9 percent of the games on average (median 47.9, 90-
percent CI [43.8; 51.4]), suggesting that real teams (with their success-rate of 57.6 percent) beat 
the truth-wins benchmark. Considering part 1 and part 2 separately presents a similar picture: In 
the first run-through of the six games, real teams win 54.2 percent of the games while simulated 
teams win 45.6 percent on average (median 45.8, 90-percent CI [41.7; 48.6]); in the second run-
through, real teams win 61.1 percent while simulated teams win 51.5 percent on average (median 
51.4, 90-percent CI [45.8; 56.9]). 
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 We chose 90-percent CIs for comparability with the study by Cooper and Kagel (2005). Choosing a stricter 95-
percent confidence interval would not alter any of the results qualitatively. 
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Re-running the simulations after grouping the games according to their length into short (m = 3 
and m = 8), medium (m = 11 and m  = 19) and long (m = 21 and m  = 29), reveals that the team 
advantage appears to be modulated by the complexity of the game. Figure 1 plots the share of 
games won for individuals and real teams as well as the median performance of the simulated 
teams together with 90-percent confidence intervals over the three groups. The advantage of real 
teams increases with game length. Only in medium and long games do they outperform the simu-
lated teams.7 
Figure 1 – Share of games won and length of game 
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 Interestingly, the data on behavior in information cascades by Fahr and Irlenbusch (2011) yields a somewhat simi-
lar pattern. Fahr and Irlenbusch distinguish dilemma situations in which decision-makers should “follow the herd” 
instead of their private signal from non-dilemma situations. They observe that only 55.5 percent of individual deci-
sions in dilemma situations are rational compared to 97.4 percent of the remaining individual decisions. Re-
analyzing their data with respect to the truth-wins norm, we find that teams fall short of simulated teams in non-
dilemma situations. Yet, in the more demanding dilemma situations the difference in performances is not significant 
anymore. Note, however, that the behavior in information cascades crucially depends on the players’ beliefs and not 
only on the ability to reason strategically.  
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4  Conclusion 
Our contribution to the literature is twofold: First, we introduce the race game to the study of 
team performance and show that teams outperform individuals in a game that can be solved by 
backward induction. The employed race game is especially suitable for identifying synergies in 
team performance as optimal play does not depend on beliefs and is the same for a wide range of 
preferences. Second, we show that in this game teams are only able to create synergies if a suffi-
cient degree of complexity is prevalent. This observation is broadly in line with conjectures by 
Charness et al. (2010) and Cooper and Kagel (2005), who suggest a relation between task com-
plexity and the advantages teams have over individuals. Of course, one has to be careful in draw-
ing general conclusions from this observation but it might explain some of the mixed results on 
the truth-wins benchmark. Furthermore, the race game remains a rather abstract task. It would be 
important to learn whether our findings extend to more natural decision environments. 
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Appendix A: Instructions (translated from German)
The first part of the following instructions was read aloud by the experimenter. It was accomp
nied by slides and a short video that were shown on a central screen in the laboratory. In case of 
the Team treatment, subjects subsequently had to read the second part of the instructions in their 
respective sound-proof cubicle.
 
Part 1 
 
Hello and welcome! Today you are taking part in an experiment in which you will be able to earn 
money. How much money you wi
 
[Team treatment only: The instructions of today’s experiment consist of two parts. I will read part 
one now. You will find the second part later inside the cubicles. Please enter your respective c
bicle after the first part of the instructions. You can find the number of your cubicle on the table 
tennis ball that you have found at your current desk.]
 
Important: All your decisions are made anonymously. Nobody will be able to link the choices 
you made to your name. We wil
there are two important rules: 
 
 
1. Signal us, if you do not understand something. We want you to have a perfect understan
ing of everything! 
11 
 
 
ll earn depends on your decisions.  
 
l tell you in a moment what the experiment is about. First of all 
 
 
a-
u-
d-
2. It is not allowed to talk to other participan
you will be immediately excluded from this experiment. Consequently you will also earn 
no money in this case. 
 
Now let’s return to the rules of the game. Several times each of you will individually play a ga
against the computer. The more often you win against the computer, the more money you will 
earn. How does the game look like?
 
The computer challenges you. The goal of the game is to reach and collect a treasure. 
 
 
The treasure, which looks like a yellow square, has been buried by the computer in a cave, which 
has only one entry. You and the computer can reach the treasure only by using the entrance of the 
cave.  
 
12 
 
 
ts. If you, however, talk to another participant 
 
 
me 
 
 Unfortunately, the computer has blocked the passag
more red stones. (This means that behind the treasure there are no more red stones but only air.) 
To reach the treasure you have to remove the red stones. The stones can only be removed by ca
rying them out through the entrance of the cave. This means that you and the computer can only 
move the stone, which is the closest to the entrance. 
 
You can remove the stones by packing them into your box. This box (the blue rectangle on the 
left side) only fits one, two, three, or at most four stones. 
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e from the entry to the treasure with one or 
 
 
 
 
 
r-
By removing the stones you alternate with your rival, the computer.
 
The computer can also remove stones and also has a box (the blue rectangle on the right side) that 
fits four stones at most.  
 
 
After every move the stones in your box and the computer’s box disappear. The winner is the 
player who packs the treasure in his box first. In this game you are always the first who can pack 
stones into your box and remove them. Thereafter, it is the computer’s turn. Sam
computer tries to win the game and to put the treasure into his box.
 
You can pick a stone by clicking on it with the mouse, holding the button and pulling the stone 
into your box. (If you have put more stones in your box than you wanted to, 
stones back into the cave.) When there are as many stones in your box as you want to remove, 
you have to click on the blue checkmark button and the stones disappear. Then it is the co
puter’s turn and you can observe how many stones the co
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mputer removes. 
e as you, the 
you can pull the 
m-
You take turns with the computer until one of you removes the treasure and wins. You can only 
win by packing the stone into your box and removing it. Same as you, the computer must remove 
at least one stone at each turn.
 
There is a special feature: After the computer has hidden the treasure it has blocked your view to 
the cave with bushes, that look like green squares. The computer knows what is hidden behind 
each green bush. If you want to see what is behind the green bushes as wel
click on the hedge trimmer. 
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l, you just have to 
Starting from the entry of the cave you can remove two adjacent bushes by clicking on the hedge 
trimmer once.  
 
In each move you can remove as many green bushes as you want. Behind every green bush the
can be either a red stone, or nothing, or the treasure. As mentioned before, you play several 
games consecutively. These games differ from each other only in the number of red stones, 
blocking your way to the treasure. For each game you win you will rec
 
When you entered this room you received a card with your code name. Please keep it safe. At the 
end of the experiment you have to enter your code name in the computer. You also need your 
card to collect your payoff. 
 
At the end of the experiment your respective payoffs will be calculated. After this the cash desk 
in the corridor outside the laboratory opens. There you can collect a closed envelope containing 
your payoff by showing your card. The cashier does not know what is inside these en
Please collect your payoffs immediately after the experiment.
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eive five Euro.
 
 
 
re 
 
velopes. 
Questions 
 
Before we start we will ask some questions so that we can help you better to understand the 
game. 
  
Please answer the questions with “Yes” or “No” by pulling the 
front of you on the monitor, into the green or the red area.
 
1) Please have a look at the following game. Does the computer know behind which green 
bush the treasure lies? 
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blue ball, which will appear in 
 
 
 
 2) Please have a look at the following game. Do yo
 
 
3) Please have a look at the following game. Are you allowed to remove all green bushes 
with the hedge trimmer now?
 
 
4) Please have a look at the following game. Is it correct, that the computer is winning the 
game? 
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u see where the treasure is?
 
 
 
 
 5) Please have a look at the following game. You want to pack two stones into your box in 
order to win. Is this possible?
 
[Team treatment only: 
 
Part 2 
 
Playing in teams: During the experiment you will play the game that was just presented. You will 
play against the computer jointly with another participant. The decisions will only be entered by 
one of the team members (player A). The other team member (player B) can observe the course 
of the game on the screen. Which player you are, will be shown on your screen.
 
Chat: During the experiment each team can communicate via chat messages. You can decide 
freely about the content of the chat. But you are not allowed to reveal personal information about 
yourself like name, age, address, field of study (including lecturer
that would allow identification of the field of study) or similar. Anyone who violates these co
munication rules will be excluded from the experiment and will not receive any money.]
 
19 
 
 
s, lectures or lecture contents, 
 
m-
 
20 
Appendix B: Data 
 Win in game  Age   
ID 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Female (months) Team Observer 
1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 247 0 0 
2 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 240 0 0 
3 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 250 0 0 
4 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 249 0 0 
5 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 249 0 0 
6 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 246 0 0 
7 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 241 0 0 
8 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 240 0 0 
9 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 243 0 0 
10 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 242 0 0 
11 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 246 0 0 
12 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 246 0 0 
13 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 243 0 0 
14 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 240 0 0 
15 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 242 0 0 
16 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 240 0 0 
17 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 244 0 0 
18 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 245 0 0 
19 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 241 0 0 
20 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 248 0 0 
21 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 242 0 0 
22 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 248 1 0 
23 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 248 1 1 
24 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 240 1 0 
25 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 246 1 1 
26 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 248 1 0 
27 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 241 1 1 
28 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 239 1 0 
29 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 250 1 1 
30 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 248 1 0 
31 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 241 1 1 
32 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 248 1 0 
33 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 239 1 1 
34 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 246 1 0 
35 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 250 1 1 
36 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 245 1 0 
37 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 247 1 1 
38 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 241 1 0 
39 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 246 1 1 
40 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 243 1 0 
41 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 242 1 1 
42 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 249 1 0 
43 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 245 1 1 
44 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 244 1 0 
45 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 239 1 1 
 
 
 
 
